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In this paper we delineate the conditions and features of 
what we call an existential philosophy of history in relation 
to customary trends in the field of the philosophy of history. 
We do this by circumscribing what a transgenerational 
temporality and what our entanglement in ethical relations 
with temporal others ask of us as existential and responsive 
selves and by explicating what attitude we need to have when 
trying to responsibly respond to other vulnerable beings in 
our historical world of life. 
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Neste artigo, delineamos as condições e características do 
que chamamos de filosofia existencial da história em relação 
às tendências atuais do campo da filosofia da história. 
Primeiramente, circunscrevemos o que uma temporalidade 
transgeracional e o que nosso enredamento em relações 
éticas com outros temporais nos pedem como selfs 
existenciais e responsivos. Em segundo lugar, explicamos 
qual atitude precisamos ter ao tentar responder de forma 




















THE CONCEPT OF HISTORY IN RELATION TO 
THE METAPHYSICS AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF TIME 
 
It is often argued that philosophy of history is different from a 
philosophy of time, mostly because philosophy of history is thought to be about 
the logic of historical method and the possibility of knowing past events and 
their interconnections, as well as the narrative structure of historical writing, 
while philosophy of time concerns metaphysical issues such as the nature of time 
and the possibilities of time apprehension. Yet the very concept of history is 
temporal and depends on our apprehending time. “History,” contends historian 
Marc Bloch, is a study “of men in time” (Bloch 1954, 27). This is generally taken 
to suggest that temporal otherness is integral to the idea of historical 
consciousness. Historical inquiry means that we relate to a changing world, 
primarily to the world that was. But integral to historical consciousness is also, 
in Bloch’s estimation, a relation to other persons who lived back then, with 
whom we are generationally connected (Bloch 1954, 22-29). In the task of 
knowing and understanding the past, historical inquiry is a relationship to a 
human past. This means that a philosophy of history cannot concern accounts 
of temporality in general, but must relate to a temporality that to some degree 
concerns the connectedness of human life. Such a philosophy of history would 
exceed history understood as mere changes from presence to absence, or 
absence being a condition that we must uncover and retrospectively make 
present again in historiography, memory, and related experiences. Instead, to 
make the connectedness of human life our temporal point of reference is the 
start of what we call an existential philosophy of history. 
Bloch’s classical account, however, is often challenged on the claim that 
natural historical phenomena are also part of history although they are in 
principle excluded from the historian’s craft (eg. Tamm and Olivier 2019). In 
this way, the contemporary discourse of philosophy of history is extended onto 
a philosophy of time that concerns the passage of time in general, with no human 
point of reference. One talks about conceiving unprecedented changes, the 
anthropocentric epoch of humanity within the passage of geological time, as well 
as the possibility of a history without humans. This equates a concept of history 
with a metaphysics of time that is to its core concerned with explaining change. 
If history is what has ceased to be, the condition that is past and temporally 
irrecoverable, what more is there to say with regard to those persons who are 
not contemporary with ourselves? 
In this regard, it would be important to emphasize that the predominant 
conception of history as a cosmology of changing conditions, designating that 
which  is no longer present but which influences or determines what follows, is 
grounded in a philosophy of time that is concerned with presence and absence 
as ontological matters---as states of being that are more or less formal and 
abstract and that are described in ontologies consistent with or in dissent from 
the Western metaphysical tradition. Therefore, we can reconsider time by asking, 
what is the difference between understanding temporality as an ontology of 
change and understanding it as our relation to other persons who are not our 
contemporaries? There are numerous ways to re-theorize historical time, but this 
question is the one that is asked from the existential point of view. 






When trying to reconsider the concept of history by raising this question, 
there seems, at first glance, to be no very deep difference between passage of 
time and non-contemporaneity as ways of circumscribing temporality. We easily 
regard change in itself as either the ontological essence of time or as the temporal 
ideality or effect that is a precondition for any notion of causality and experience. 
The metaphysician would claim, with Francoise Hartog, that we live in a current 
“regime of historicity” that will collapse and that will find its temporal successors 
(Hartog 2017, 106). The philosopher of mind would claim, with Immanuel Kant, 
that temporality is, the inner form of the experiencing subject’s apprehension 
(Kant 1998, A32-34/B49-50); time “determines the relation of representations 
in our inner state” (Kant 1998, A33/B50). Metaphysics in this sense is a mere 
extension of the apprehension of causal time, as it invites a speculation about 
one notion of time coming to an end, while simultaneously not understanding 
that such speculation does not break with customary ideas of time at all but 
rather empowers change as the sole essence of temporality. If regimes of time 
change, like the self that has changed and is no longer what it was, or like the 
surface of the world that has changed and the people who lived back then are 
gone, the very process of change becomes the common denominator for our 
idea of apprehending temporality. This is the case regardless of whether we 
speak of an eroding rock, of ourselves, or of past generations in a temporal 
human lifeworld.  
In truth, however, the phenomenology of time consciousness often 
breaks with the ontology of change by elaborating Kant’s notion of time as the 
inner form of the experiencing subject’s apprehension, by relating time 
consciousness to memories and expectations, and by furthermore taking this 
temporal ideality to the core of descriptions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity 
(Ricoeur 1990, Part 1). As David Carr suggests: 
 
your ‘now’ is as much a mark of your otherness and differentness from 
me as is your spatial ‘there’, because it is a point of view on a different 
time, a past and a future which are different from mine. In that sense it is 
a temporal point of view which in principle I can never occupy. (Carr 2014, 
180) 
 
Thus, our understanding of each other as temporal others designates 
how we are intersubjectively entangled and, by extension, how we respond to 
and are responsible for the other who is not ourselves. But even if the 
phenomenological account acknowledges the experiencing subject’s 
apprehension of temporality, it does not necessarily deflate the significance of 
change for subjective experience. The givenness of the present and the 
impossibility of the absent usually persist even phenomenologically. In this 
regard, the idea of change as the essence of time tends to be shared even when 















Clearly time is experienced in the ways we divide it up, the manner in 
which we structure it is in terms of events and pattern of events. What is 
our relation to our own past? As we experience the cultural present 
becoming the cultural past, what is more important, sameness or 
difference, continuity of change? This is the place to consider the well-
worn distinction between cyclical and linear conceptions of time. Time is 
change; but is change significant or insignificant? (Carr 2014, 181) 
 
If change is at the center of temporal apprehension and of our idea of 
history, we must, however, ask for its significance. Carr invites our asking, for 
instance, how and in what sense change is significant to our entanglement in 
relation to those who have preceded us. This is where the existential and lived 
experience of being in time with those who are not contemporary with ourselves 
arises (see Ruin 2018). It is also where any metaphysics of time that holds 
ontological absolutes of presence and absence appears as less relevant to our 
being with and responding to temporal others. Accordingly, it is important to 
outline a philosophy of history that takes seriously the mortal and often non-
contemporary other as the ethical contexture in which our questions about 
temporality and history emerges. 
 
 
HUMAN EXISTENCE AND TRANSGENERATIONAL TEMPORALITY 
 
The difference between the two ways of relating to time and history we 
have described – the metaphysical/phenomenological ontology of presence-
absence and the existential entanglement with temporal others -- is not merely 
aspectual. It has important existential implications as to how we come to 
understand ourselves as involved in a historical lifeworld. This transpires in the 
sense that the notion of temporality as change seems to be insufficient with 
regard to other persons’ not being our contemporaries, and in the sense that our 
relation to them marks a very different temporal understanding than a mere 
passage of time. Our either being or not being contemporary with each other in 
life suggests not only that we cannot be identical to each other, that we cannot 
live in exact the same time and place as the other but also, more importantly, as 
Carr suggests (2014, 179-181), that our existence as personal selves is one of 
acknowledging the other as a finite, temporal other in our standing in relation to 
the other who is another than ourselves. Thus, acknowledging the other who is 
not ourselves, or the other who is not contemporary with ourselves, is not simply 
to avoid platitudes, such as the realization that we lived at different instances on 
earth. It is rather to recognize that our selves are made possible in relation to the 
temporal others, for instance: that were born by the one before us and will give 
life to the other after us; we will die one after the other, in turn we will bury each 
other; we will benefit from and be burdened by what those not contemporary 
with ourselves have done. Thus we are generationally connected to each other 
in the sense that we respond to the ones that are temporally other than ourselves 
(Fritsch 2018, 52). 
 
 






The existential difference between temporality as change and temporarily 
as non-contemporaneity can be shown through what temporal relations these 
concepts lets us capture, and what ethical significances they bear (see Lévinas 
1987, 91-94; Fritsch 2018; Ruin 2018). 
Whereas it would be possible to say that we are not the same persons we 
were earlier in our lives or that the world as a whole is not what it was, it is not 
possible to say that we are not contemporary with ourselves or that the world is 
not contemporary with itself. But it is, on the contrary, possible to claim that we 
are not contemporary with temporal others, with the persons who lived back 
then. The having-been or will-be testifies to a previous or coming condition of 
an entity that changes, whereas the person who is not contemporary with 
ourselves marks a bond to those who live at another time; and thereby the 
concept of non-contemporaneity illuminates how we are caught up in a life with 
our predecessors and the afterlife. Before its being an ontological statement of 
how the world is structured, non- contemporaneity invokes our 
acknowledgment that we stand in an ethical relation to those of another 
generation. 
In Taking Turns With The Earth (2018), Matthias Fritsch highlights the 
importance of rethinking the transgenerational possibilities of being a self, as 
well as the existential phenomenological obligations of acknowledging 
responsibility for (in the sense of our responding to) passed and future persons 
in a transgenerational life. In order to explicate the ways in which we are 
entangled in a responsibility for the other, or in transgenerational reciprocity, 
Fritsch argues that 
 
it is critical to overcome a presentist, nongenerational conception of the 
self and its time, one that views the present as cut off from the absent past 
and the absent future. This view of time, we have seen, makes 
responsibility to future [and past] people seem anomalous and problematic 
from the beginning, for such responsibility would have to cross the abyss 
between presence and absence. (Fritsch 2018, 80) 
 
Transgenerationality does not undo our using the concepts of present 
and absent other or presence and absence in general, but it does challenge the 
customary ontological categories of presence and absence, as well as the 
necessity of thinking that the possibilities of responding to a past and future 
others are always mediated to the extent of being impossible. It helps us 
reconsider exactly what ethical significance these concepts bear as they, in ethical 
terms, cannot be what determine our relations to temporal others who have 
ethical integrity. Fritsch continues: 
 
Stretching the living out toward the future pulls future people into the 
presence of the living, whose contemporaneity is thus put into question. 
Undoing the assumption of co-presence among the living by recognizing 
the temporal alterity (and natal mortality) in the now-living other renders 
the temporal distance to future people less anomalous. It thus leads us to 
stress, among other things, (asymmetrical) overlap among generations, 
intergenerational communities, and institutions, the dependence of many 
of our current projects on future [and past] people, and so on. 
(Fritsch 2018, 81) 
 






Stressing the transgenerational possibilities for self-understanding and 
action, involves the non-contemporaneity of other persons and thus shows this 
multitude of asymmetrical ethical relations between persons. But this 
recognition can also, as Bennett Gilbert has argued, be taken to galvanize our 
very situatedness within a world of life in general and thus becomes “our moral 
response to being parts of the whole” (Gilbert 2020, 73), which we do “by fully 
responding to the common opportunity that is life and to the common end in 
the grave that history tells us about.” (Gilbert 2020, 73) This ethical ideality 
implies our performatively sustaining or repairing “our relationship to all other 
beings through historicity, since our past is a vast aspect of the interdependence 
necessary for survival” (Gilbert 2020, 74). 
In this respect generational temporality and reciprocity invokes an 
existential philosophy of history that goes beyond taking historical 
consciousness, or historicity, to refer merely to our being sensitive to temporal 
change. It has ethical ideality that enables us to think beyond historicity as a strictly 
human matter into our situatedness in a world of life. When we regard those of 
previous generations as Thou’s with whom our relations are intimate and ethical, 
rather than distanced and observational, we are finding the best position from 
which to extend ethical ideality in to various kinds of others in authentic ways, 
rather than in groundless, or selfish, or heedless ways that pretend to give us 
more understanding than they really do (Buber 1937, 6). 
Through this extensive historicity we thus take a detour into what it 
would mean to live in a world or life (Gilbert 2020, 73-75), or what it would man 
to share a terrestrial existence where living beings take turns (Fritsch 2018), but 
we also take a detour into what it means for us to live within a tradition. In Truth 
and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer stresses the importance of taking seriously 
what it means to live within a tradition and thus what it is that differs the 
temporal understanding of a hermeneutic consciousness from a descriptive 
historical consciousness. 
“Historical consciousness,” Gadamer contends, “knows about the 
otherness of the other, about the past in its otherness, just as the understanding 
of the Thou knows the Thou as a person” (Gadamer 2006, 354). In the historical 
mode we understand the other as other exactly in the sense that we know the 
past as something different from the present, a condition that is irrecoverable 
and gone. This is not necessarily to reduce the past into an aspect of the present, 
because through “the otherness of the past” the historical consciousness “seeks 
not the instantiation of a general law but something historically unique” 
(Gadamer 2006, 354), a unique temporal instance or condition that can be 
objectively uncovered and described. But, Gadamer stresses, this appeal to a 
historical consciousness creates a dialectical illusion because it never invites a 
real reflective situated response to the past. “By claiming to transcend its own 
conditionedness completely in knowing the other,” historical consciousness “is 
involved in a false dialectical appearance,” as it counts itself out from the 
reflective relationship with temporal others (Gadamer 2006, 354). In this case 
there is no possibility of being moved by what has happened and by those who 
are not contemporary with ourselves, which suggests that the historical attitude 
is seriously in existential denial. To take temporality in an existential hermeneutic 
sense is exactly to recognize the moral bond between us and temporal others as 
a reflective I-Thou relationship, where we ourselves may be fundamentally 






changed through this relationship. Gadamer argues: 
 
A person who does not admit that he is dominated by prejudices will fail 
to see what manifests itself by their light. It is like the relation between I 
and Thou. A person who reflects himself out of the mutuality of such a 
relation changes this relationship and destroys its moral bond. A person who 
reflects himself out of a living relationship to tradition destroys the true meaning of this 
tradition in exactly the same way. (Gadamer 2006, 354)1 
 
In other words, like the I-Thou relationship that is constituted through 
our inevitably approaching each other from different places – primarily in the 
sense that we are different persons having lived through different experiences, 
but also that there may be a temporal and cultural distance between us that 
enables certain kinds experiences and makes other experiences impossible for us 
to live through – we must recognize that historical temporality is also a mutual 
relationship between us and temporal others. This is fundamentally recognized 
through asking the temporal others a question and letting them speak to us. “In 
human relations the important thing is,” Gadamer says, “to experience the Thou 
truly as a Thou—i.e., not to overlook his claim but to let him really say something 
to us. Here is where openness belongs” (Gadamer 2006, 355). In the existential 
hermeneutic relationship, we are importantly responsible for seeing the other 
and letting her speak to us in our reflective conversation with her who is other, 
contemporary or not, than ourselves. We are guided by a question of doing her 
justice. “But ultimately,” Gadamer continues, “this openness does not exist only 
for the person who speaks; rather, anyone who listens is fundamentally open” 
(Gadamer 2006, 355). We must be open to listening to concrete temporal others 
and to our tradition in order to understand not only the other but where we 
ourselves stand within this I-Thou relationship, as well as how we should 
respond by being situated within it. 
The ethical importance of Gadamer’s claims could be shown through 
the paradigmatic example of the Thirty Years’ War that is often used in the 
philosophy of history to show the otherness of the past, and sometimes even in 
attempts to show that our relationship with temporal others is fundamentally 
broken (Danto 1985, 152-153; Roth 2020, 8; see also Ahlskog 2020). 
Existentially, the first thing in relation to a person who lived through the Thirty 
Years’ War is, of course, that we ourselves cannot have a first-person experience 
regarding what it was like to participate in or live through that war, but that we 
must understand that we have a relationship to what it was like to live back then. 
In this sense we ask a question to a historical other as a reflective Thou, a 
reflective Thou that we ourselves are responsible for seeing, from which a 
 
1 “The word ‘prejudice’ etymologically breaks down into pre-judice or pre-judgement. 
Judgement is not possible without the ‘pre’ that comes before it. All judgements are conditioned 
by prejudgements. This is an older, pre-modern sense of prejudice to which Gadamer wants to 
draw our attention, whereas the familiar understanding of prejudice is unreflective judgement or 
over-hasty reasoning, resulting in the bigotry of purely subjective opinion or the unreflective 
parroting of purely received wisdom. The point being made here is that judgements are made 
possible not by an abstract and neutral reason but a set of prereflective involvements with the 
world that stand behind judgements and in fact make them possible. A condition of making 
reflective and evaluative judgements about the world is the possession of prejudices: without 
prejudgements there can be no judgements.” (Lawn and Keane 2011, 96). 






changed understanding of ourselves is possible from what this Thou lets us see. 
We may ask what the Thirty Years’ War implied, or what it was like to take part 
in it. By asking these questions, we can reflectively understand, on the one hand, 
that a person who lived during the Thirty Years’ War himself could not see that 
the war lasted for 30 years, but that this way of describing the event expresses a 
posteriorly constructed historical relationship to it. Perhaps a person who lived 
then did not even perceive that the war was continuous in the way we now think. 
A person who took part in the war could, for instance, not see the institutional 
changes that this conflict resulted in much later. But through the question, on 
the other hand, we can also understand a vulnerable human reality of misery and 
death that is essentially connected to what it was like to live then, despite the fact 
that it is a conflict that took place a very long time ago, which means that no 
living person today has any remaining war trauma as a result of it, and that the 
societies that were then destroyed are no longer burnt down but have been 
rebuilt. The question thus opens up a reflection on how we ourselves stand in 
relation to what is being told – in terms of our being presently living Europeans 
or Americans, Lutherans or Catholics, or something else – and the reflection is 
called upon us as an ethical relation in which we respond to what has taken place, 
and to what will continue to be spoken of and retold. 
 
 
HISTORICAL INQUIRY AS AN EXISTENTIAL I-THOU RELATIONSHIP 
 
Even if it makes sense to say that the reflective I-Thou relationship with 
historical tradition is not always, or even primarily, a relationship with a 
particular person in flesh and blood, and in that sense is different from a direct 
I-Thou relationship with another person speaking to us, Gadamer shows that a 
true existential philosophy of history implies that the ethical bond to temporal 
others is not undone by their not being contemporary with ourselves (Buber 
1937, 11; Lévinas 1987, 94). The transgenerational nature of historical 
knowledge therefore makes the I-Thou relationship essential to it, as we have 
argued. Then what are the reasons that someone could hold that philosophy of 
history is not well advised to so value this personal relationship as to make itself 
existential? 
The most direct objection comes from a majority of philosophers and 
practitioners of scientific historiography. In principle, they object to personal 
involvement and to “advocacy” in historiography, both on an empirical and a 
conceptual level, because advocacy, they hold, can lead to epistemic 
irresponsibility (the thought is often in line with Bloch 1954, 139-141). Any 
scientific endeavor should avoid epistemically irrelevant values and judgements 
in order to meet scientific standards (see Douglas 71-79). The fear that this 
objection to advocacy warns against is that personal involvement distorts the 
ascertainable facts and the relevant processes of reasoning in order to force 
historiographic accounts to validate unwarranted, often predetermined, 
conclusions. The reasons that someone might behave irresponsibly is, for 
instance, her higher-order ethical, religious, or ideological convictions or 
commitments; individual financial desires or needs; bigotry and intolerance; and 
personal hatred and resentment. From the scientific point of view, it is thus hard 






to see why such powerful forces as these, which sometimes have the force of 
delusion, will be stopped by pursuing considerations raised by a universal ethical 
demand of the I-Thou relationship.  
In a way, our familiarity with error, as well as the possibility of 
interpreting and arranging facts, is in itself one of the reasons that there tends to 
be an element of advocacy in every historiographic endeavor. Even if one claims 
such advocacy to be grounded in purely epistemic values and judgements, no 
position, however draconian its commitment to realism, materialism, or 
scientism, denies this, because evaluation are internal to any epistemic enterprise 
and are compatible with notions of making sense of the existence of objective 
reality (cf. McMullin 1983; Kuhn 1970). As has been shown for instance in 
Verstehen philosophy of science, the claim to “objectivity” is in itself to advocate 
a value discrimination between epistemically relevant and irrelevant values with 
regard to the inquiry at hand (Weber 1949; Rickert 1962, 13-21; Bloch 1954, 141-
142). Thus, not all values, not even all ethical values, are values of the same kind. 
But the existential approach to the work of scholarship need not necessarily lead 
to distortion and error, just as the realist approach does not entail that every 
result produced under it is correct. Higher-order commitments motivate 
everyone, in so far as what motivates someone must be named as her higher-
order commitments, even if the principles by which we can understand them are 
comically self-interested, or malevolent and debased, or just unthought. It is 
important even in science to understand what values motivates us, what values 
bind us, and what values stands in our way. The I-Thou relationship is no less a 
universal feature of personal existence than is our fallibility and is no less 
important because of our fallibility. 
It is true that restraint in the expression of opinion, belief, and moral 
judgment in a work of history is appealing. Quiet force of evidence and argument 
has dignity and need in principle never be awkward as it is, supposedly, free from 
ethical involvement. It has a simpler, grander, more noble power than shouting, 
blaming, nagging, exaggerating, scolding, litigating, grand-standing, preaching, 
and overacting. As intellectually and aesthetically satisfying as this scientific ideal 
is, the scholar is not free from ethical commitments just by being situated into 
the realm of epistemic values. Allan Megill argues that the historian’s most 
important ethical commitment is to honesty, which does not give a pretense of 
overcoming the past’s “breach with the present” (Megill 2004, 51). The I-Thou 
relationship requires honesty if it is to be sustained (Megill 2004, 49). He 
accurately calls the appeal to honesty “resistance to historiographic wish-
fulfillment” (Megill 2004, 50). So certainly, in terms of the category of virtue, 
honesty seems to be one most important virtue. It is necessary to the missions 
of letting, helping, and making the dead speak for themselves. But honesty is not 
sufficient to these missions, and it is even less sufficient to the goal that her task 
imposes on the historian, namely to speak for the dead. 
This is because speaking in our own voice for another and thereby letting 
her speak is a question of ethically responding to another person who can no 
longer speak for herself (see van der Heiden 2014). If I speak in my voice for 
you, I am ethically obliged to consider a question of my doing justice to you. I 
must question how I respond to you and how I let you speak to me. The answer 
to these questions is not solely to do so honestly. All those who seek or claim 
historical knowledge are necessarily speaking for themselves, in their own voices, 






as well as helping or allowing past actors to speak. Speaking for one’s self and 
for others is the existential situation that transgenerational finite temporality puts 
us into; and the ethical way to meet this situation is the I-Thou relationship. We 
are actors in this world in which honesty, as profoundly requisite as it is, never 
alone suffices for comprehension and persuasion. In short, we must be 
advocates; but advocates in this sense, which of course ought not be that practice 
of getting what we want at any cost which is blamed for dishonest “advocacy,” 
that we must address ourselves to others by discovering what the I-Thou 
relationship must fully asks of us. 
But what does the I-Thou relationship ask of us in our relationship to 
the past? In a way, one could say that the scientific attitude as such breaks the I-
Thou relation, as it, in Martin Buber’s terms, treats the other as an object that 
can be experienced and known. In this respect the I-Thou relation has been 
transformed into an I-It relation; the other has been made into an object of 
scientific investigation (Buber 1937, 39-40) Thus, even if we occasionally speak 
of the concepts of objectivity as an epistemic virtue, or of honesty and openness 
as ethical virtues, we still uphold the attitude of an I-It relation as long as our 
concern is to delineate the ideality of what a virtuous persona should consist of 
in relation to an impersonal object of historical inquiry. Being honest about a 
property or thing does not make it into my Thou. In contrast, taking the attitude 
of an I-Thou would mean that we truly “feel addressed and we answer” (Buber 
1937, 6) to the other person by our standing in relation, whereas if we “do not 
serve it aright it is broken, or it breaks me” (Buber 1937, 10). It break us in the 
sense that our own existence as well as the other’s becomes imminent in a world 
of things, whereby we forget that such reification means to exist in denial of the 
other one as a Thou who ethically demands our attention. 
The humanities often speak of other peoples’ values, or of other persons, 
as objects of detached knowledge. Thus, we must steadily be concerned with a 
question of how the other should be addressed in order to not be appropriated 
into the world of things, how we despite our inquiry are guided by a question of 
responding to the other as a Thou. Jonathan Lear describes in the context of 
psychoanalysis how this meeting in human studies is also a meeting between two 
persons, and I-Thou relationship, where the analyst's “object” is another person 
who addresses you, a person whom the analyst must do justice; and where a 
question of “objectivity” becomes a question of understanding the other person 
through oneself, inside this relationship. He writes: 
 
The analytic process allows the analysand to relate to objects in new sorts 
of ways—to relate to them as distinct persons, having their own points of 
view--that is to relate to them objectively. This opens new ways of relating 
to others; but it also opens new ways of relating to oneself: for now one 
is able to live with others as the distinct and real people they are. Becoming 
objective in this sense opens up the possibility for true human intimacy. 
For previously one was not genuinely relating to another--or rather, 
insofar as one did relate to others, it was through the confusing fog of 
one’s own wishes, hopes, and disappointments, which were regularly 
experienced as being in the other. 
(Lear 2003, 47-48) 
 
 






The nature of human studies thus follows the nature of ethical inquiry, 
which is to realize and enter an I-Thou relation, and to pass with, through, and 
beyond the virtue of honesty to more challenging, more fearsome, and more 
loving ways of being. As Lear shows, the epistemic standard of objectivity is in 
itself tied to an ethical question of our doing justice to another, our listening to 
her. Our passing beyond virtues is also true of any objection on epistemic 
grounds, because the fidelity to verifiability or falsifiability stands enclosed 
within the sphere of positivity as an ethical presupposition. Honesty if it is to be 
meaningful is thus a virtue that is socialized within positive science, even though 
the exercise of the virtue, or failure to exercise it, is the responsibility of an 
individual actor. This is the case even if we stipulate that individual agency is 
separable from the social nature of intellectual creditworthiness; and it is also the 
case even if one can argue that some group of virtues, rather than this one virtue, 
is involved (van Dongen and Paul 2017). Furthermore, adherence to virtues or 
to their opposite is estimated by intellectual inspection, although virtues 
themselves might include the non-rational, not falling outside the sphere of 
positivity. The I-Thou relationship is profoundly different in nature. It is an 
ethical realm different from virtues, with its own way of claiming our 
participation—a way that is closer to being a universal context than it is to the 
particularizing focus on the character of the persona that virtue ethics prizes due 
to its claim that the object of ethics is personal happiness in the way one lives 
one’s life (Korsgaard 1996, 167-169). 
In this sense, the ethical task of historical inquiry exceeds the reach of 
the epistemic virtues. In being responsive to those they study, historians are not 
exempt from the universal ethic of the I-Thou relationship. This is not to say 
that this or that historian might not be responsible to different virtues in 
different circumstances. Rather the objection over the possibility of epistemic 
irresponsibility is a matter of more clearly understanding the ethical nature of 
historiographic practice. As such the value of the objection from epistemic 
responsibility arises from concerns within the philosophy of historiography, 
which by itself is a wide field that partakes of issues of method and also of 
substantive epistemological and ontological concerns from both the humanities 
and the philosophy of science. But we see in the existential point of view the 
direction in which to view philosophy of history as something larger than 
philosophy of historiography because it connects history to relational ethics as 



















THEORIA AND PATHOS 
 
Reflection over the ethics of human studies or historical practice thus 
brings us to the question of how we should integrate the ethical universality of 
the I-Thou relationship with philosophy of history. Integration of a 
universalizing philosophical ethics and history into an existential philosophy of 
history is conceived on the basis of something that must be observed about 
philosophy itself—and even about conceptual thinking in general. The 
existential ethical standpoint gives us a simple but effective binary typology of 
conceptual thought. The first kind of philosophizing is theoria in the original 
sense of contemplation along with the sense of it developed in modernity as 
reflective looking and generalizing rationality that can be abstractive or 
inferential. The second kind of philosophizing is pathos. This comprises 
“feelings” in the sense of suffering, or in the sense of seeing the afflicted other. 
This might at first seem a lop-sided schema, of which one term is large and fat 
and the other term too narrow and overly specific. But by “suffering” we mean 
the entire spectrum of what happens to us by the fortunes of nature and by our 
own hands---our vulnerability, of which history and memory are the records; 
and we include the feelings of joy that successful response to our vulnerability 
to suffering brings us to our precarity, our incompleteness, our relative 
powerlessness, personified by the Greeks as the goddess Amekhania (Herodotus, 
1957-61, 8.111.1). This includes human self-destructiveness, guilt, and terror as 
causes and conditions of suffering—things that are vivid parts of modernity and 
post-modernity, although they are often known and named in many ages and 
places. Pathos also includes the resentments we form, which so grievously 
dominate human reactivity, when we do not process hurt or loss and act out of 
active unresolved conflicts.  
The pair theoria and pathos are not the same as logic and feeling, nor the 
same as empirical inquiry as opposed to axiological thought, nor science and 
spirituality, nor the same as outwardness versus inwardness. Instead, they 
describe the mostsincere conceptual engagements as understood from one’s 
own existential situation. But this is not how pathos is usually understood. As 
Marcia Sá Cavalcante Shuback puts it in her reflection on what is involved in 
what she calls “engaged history”: in the “concept of engagement it is the relation 
between the writer and the reader that is at stake, and not merely the choice of 
the author to write in an ‘engaged’ pathos for the suffering of others, the 
injustices of society and the political situation of the time.” (2018, 165) If pathos 
is taken in its original sense, as a feature or rhetorical affectivity, the critique she 
puts forward is important because it targets the ethical irresponsibility of 
thinking that moral emotion is conjured up in the moral subject as a self-centered 
activity in the act of writing or reading. But pathos can also be taken as an 
existential attitude toward the other, and in that sense, it is closer to what 
Cavalcante Shuback calls “engagement” as our point of reference is fully the life 
of the other It is not to simply write in a tragic or realistic mode of employment; 
instead, it concerns or responds to another person as a suffering and vulnerable 
fellow being (pace White 2016, 53, 62-63). Using a fully existential historical 
pathos, we engage, through transgenerational operations, with the whole hearts, 
minds, and lives of other persons in a way that includes their hopes, joys, 






happiness, and successes, as well as their suffering. All of this is historical 
because it bears the marks of our finitude and the certainty of our passage in 
time. 
Thinking from pathos, then, is not an artifice or a trope or a device; nor 
is thinking from theoria just soulless instrumentalized reason. In the hands of 
well-meaning people, both kinds can be exercised ethically and as such could 
refer to vastly important values that the thinker aims to think through, enhance, 
and express. Thinkers working in both kinds are broadly likely to value the 
decrease of suffering and the increase of well-being. But good intentions do not 
make a view of persons from theoria into a philosophy that cares for the persons 
who are its object. The difference pertaining to theory from pathos is the force 
that care for the complexity of the human person presents to theoria. 
Humankind lives in many social and technological worlds. These worlds 
differ greatly from one another. Even in the age of globally dominant 
technologies, these vary because the forms of reason used in social organization 
and technological development are often altering and even splitting off from the 
traditional ratio that shaped Western ways and carried them across the globe. 
Euro-American ratio was itself never entirely unified, of course, because people 
changed the worlds they created in the passage of time. And so the mere 
changefulness and causal direction of the history of thought, society, and 
technology reveals beneath itself the address of persons to one another, 
motivated by and motivating the force of change. We say that this address, which 
has the I-Thou relationship as its ideal basis, breaks up the unifying impulse of 
the theoria view of causally-directed history. This is not to say that awareness of 
the suffering of others is always a motivation and certainly this is not to say that 
it always correctly motivates decision and action. But in thinking about how we 
organize and choose the manner in which we philosophize about the nature and 
history of human endeavor, it is pathos— the vulnerability one knows through 
one’s own suffering and one’s response to the suffering of others—that 
punctures theoria as a controlling disposition. It opens theoria to the whole lives 
of other persons as they actually live by staring at what it means ethically to 
respond to another. The I-Thou relationship is both behind and beyond the 
theoretical relations of observers and the observed, but also breaks right through 
the middle of such theoretical endevours. This puncture, or breaking-through, 
is the track on which the existential approach to conceptual thought brings its 




















EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 
AND THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY TODAY 
 
Much of what must be done to theorize knowledge concerns reflection 
on the relationship between what is known and how it is known. This involves 
the relationships between the observable, inferable, and logical structures of the 
known and the history of the knowing across individual, social, and other 
aspects; between the timeless and the time-bound aspects of thought; and 
between inquirers and the universe into which they inquire. In all these directions 
the field of the philosophy of history has a uniquely powerful perspective. The 
many kinds of philosophy of history testify to the fact that it covers more sides 
of the basic problem of the relations of humans, and perhaps of other conscious 
beings, to themselves, to one another, and to the world. 
The academic field (including parts of memory studies) predominantly 
uses one or more of these approaches to philosophy of history. They approach 
our relationship to the passage of time from: 
 
[1] epistemology, which includes both analytic methods and broader 
philosophy of science that looks at the past as the object of empirical 
examination; 
[2] narrativist and post-narrativist theory, which as a whole remain within 
discourse tied to the realist and idealist fight within epistemology over the status 
of the external world and/or the nature of consciousness; and 
[3] speculative philosophy, today including the recrudescence of universal 
history as “big history,” credal history in novel forms, speculative realism and 
new materialisms, posthumanisms, and utopian and dystopian theorizations of 
futurity. 
 
 These approaches usually define or are updated so as to activate 
philosophy of history for a new epoch in general philosophy, philosophical 
anthropology, and theory of culture. Speaking broadly, this sphere of philosophy 
of history aims to overcome traditional issues of ontology, generally claiming to 
have done so, in order to meet the problems of a globalized humanity that must 
live among accelerating political conflicts and biological crises.
What it is necessary to avoid in all three types, in our view, is an 
increasingly imminent return of theorizing of the past to the philosophy of 
science and to a revived view of history as primarily a matter of science about 
what can be known about the past. It seems that philosophy of history that takes 
ourselves within the human world and the lifeworld of nature as an existential 
and ethical situation is little spoken for in any contemporary philosophy of 
history that concedes reality to be, so to say, an object of positivity (whether 
objective or constructed) to be understood through theoria. This is the case even 
when, as in the case of postmodernism, the line of thought begins in anti-
foundationalism. For every possibility of studying and theorizing a general 
relational mode among persons, and especially for the colorful panorama of 
different approaches to historical theory and to historiographic practice, we are 
obliged to understand the attitude to life it must lead to, if we are to be and 
understand ourselves as moral subjects, because each of us must choose to take 
up this attitude to life or to turn away from it. In the end, what a moral subject 






is, is a person who continuously determines such attitudes to life for herself and 
consciously acts upon them rather than takes or omits them by chance out of 
the philosophical possibilities that are part of her life. The need to understand 
the attitudes toward life that our interpretive strategies lead to inevitably comes 
to us from the other persons in our lives. Their existence makes it wrong to be 
heedless of them---to leave our values to intuitions or to will instead of making 
response to the pathos of other actual people the first concern of philosophy of 
history (Elgabsi and Gilbert 2020). 
From the point of view that regards existence as the temporality in which 
the I-Thou relationship stands, any philosophy of history that does not take 
ethics as a perennial modality of matters that concern one’s own life in the face 
of the lives of others is a philosophy that endorses the escape of epistemic 
judgment from ethical judgment. Any philosophy of history that attempts to 
escape reductive naturalizing has the potential to nourish our moral life; the 
concerns of these philosophers are cognate with such existential concerns for 
the meaning of our theories in relation to other persons as we point to in this 
paper. This means that virtually every theory, naturalistic or existential or of any 
sort, that enhances our feeling for the complexity of the history, nature, and 
future of human life, in recognition of existential-ethical concerns, can be good 
for us all. But changeful time is merely the raw material of human existence, the 
living tissue of which is our ceaseless historical need to know how to treat 
ourselves and others. As moral agents, we seek to use or to cease using power 
against ourselves and others, which explodes out of our neotenic fear of death 
as the final meaning of change. Out of these temporalities are organized. 
Speculative philosophies of history that avoid reduction may recognize this, 
perhaps in useful ways, but still do not fill the needs that the lives of others bring 
to each. If philosophy of history is a reflection on our temporal being, it ought 
to work to meet our existential needs, since its core is the insistent responsibility 
in our living with the reality of generations both before and after our own—even 
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